

AGESILAUS, ANTALCIDAS, AND THE FAILED PEACE OF 392/91 B.C.

JAMES G. DEVOTO

IN THIS PAPER I would like to suggest that Agesilaus and his supporters played a decisive role in the peace conference held at Sparta in the winter of 392/91 B.C. Antalcidas' earlier initiative at Sardis in the spring of 392 had produced neither a Sparto-Persian accord nor, with the arrival of legates from the anti-Spartan coalition, a general settlement under Persian sponsorship. Thus Agesilaus, a political rival of Antalcidas, may have striven for a κοινὴ εἰρήνη in Greece to renew his campaign against Persia in Asia Minor. Although evidence for this second effort is often sparse, confused, or lacking, it is nonetheless possible, I believe, to develop a coherent and plausible explanation for the Greeks' failure to resolve their differences peaceably among themselves. To do so, it will be necessary first to consider the change in the strategic situation which worked to Peloponnesian advantage during the summer and fall.

While the overall military balance during the second half of 392 had shifted favorably for the Peloponnesians, the Spartans had been at a clear disadvantage in the eighteen months before the gathering at Sardis. Since the autumn of 394 the anti-Spartan coalition of Thebes, Athens, Corinth, and Argos had had the upper hand.¹ When hostilities had forced the recall of Agesilaus after two years' campaigning in Anatolia, the Spartans lost a rich source of booty.² Similarly, the defeat that summer of Agesilaus' brother-in-law near Cnidus by Conon's Graeco-Phoenician fleet eliminated the annual tribute of one thousand talents

I would like to express my indebtedness to the Editor and the anonymous readers of *CP*, whose suggestions for revisions of earlier versions of this paper have proved invaluable throughout. Since the formulation of these views derives from chapter 5 of my dissertation, "Agesilaos II and the Politics of Sparta, 404–377 B.C." (Loyola University, 1982), responsibility for any lingering inconsistencies or errors is purely my own.

1. The coalition was formed in the autumn of 395 to resist the Peloponnesian League. See Xen. *Hell.* 3. 5. 7–17; *Hell. Oxy.* 17. 1–18. 4; Diod. 14. 80; Andoc. 3. 20; Paus. 3. 9. 9–10; K. J. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*², vol. 3.2 (Berlin, 1927), p. 69; E. Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*⁶, vol. 5 (Stuttgart, 1958), p. 230; H. Bengtson, *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums*, vol. 2 (Munich, 1962), pp. 168–70; M. Tod, *Greek Historical Inscriptions* (Oxford, 1968), nos. 101–2; C. D. Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories* (Ithaca, 1979), p. 201.

2. Agesilaus' campaigns in 396 and 395 had yielded over 1,000 talents, as his tithe at Delphi in 394 after the battle of Coronea shows. See Xen. *Ages.* 1. 34 (which implies 2,000 talents, with a tithe of 200); Plut. *Ages.* 19. 3. On the impact of this loss of revenue, see E. David, *Sparta between Empire and Revolution* (New York, 1982), pp. 21, 23–24. The significance of Agesilaus' contribution to the state, however, should not be missed.

accruing from Lysander's settlement of 404 B.C. Third, Agesilaus' indecisive victory at Coronea in August 394 had neither detached the Boeotians from the coalition nor secured Spartan access to central Greece. Thus adverse economic conditions would soon create obstacles to Spartan conduct of the war.³ The Spartans were further threatened by Pharnabazus' monetary aid to the coalition, which assured that neither side would gain a decisive advantage.⁴ A final source of uneasiness for the Spartans was the lack of enthusiasm of some Peloponnesian allies because of the inconclusive results in the field.⁵ Accordingly, there arose among many Spartiates a growing desire for rapprochement with Persia to secure the hegemony in Greece.⁶ Thus in the winter of 393/92 Antalcidas left for Sardis.

The military situation when Antalcidas set out slightly favored the coalition. The Peloponnesians controlled Sicyon near the Corinthian Gulf and Boeotian Orchomenos and could rely on their allies in Phocis; but the coalition held Corinth and its northern port Lechaeum. From Lechaeum, with its protective walls leading to the city, the Corinthians had sailed forth in ships funded by Pharnabazus to seize control of the gulf as far west as Rhium.⁷ Moreover, the Athenians under Conon, with yet more of the satrap's money, had fortified Melos and Cythera, from which they raided Lacedaemon itself.⁸ The Athenians, however, had little cause to fear a Peloponnesian raid into Attica, since the isthmus lay firmly in the hands of the coalition. These were the conditions of the stalemate which induced the Spartans to essay a diplomatic resolution.⁹

Xenophon provides the most detailed account of the Spartan initiative at Sardis. Without alluding to financial constraints or latent problems with the Peloponnesians, he observes (*Hell.* 4. 8. 12) that the Spartans were concerned about satrapal largesse to the coalition, the Athenians' reconstruction of their long walls, and their active solicitation of allies in

3. Diod. 14. 10. 2. David, *Sparta*, p. 23, noted that after the defeat of the Peloponnesian navy in 394, the Spartan hegemony was seriously weakened.

4. Pharnabazus, satrap of the Hellespontine region, sailed to Greece with Conon to disburse funds for Corinthian shipbuilding and to complete the restoration of Athens' long walls: Xen. *Hell.* 4. 8. 6-12; Isoc. 5. 64; Nepos *Conon* 4. 5; Diod. 14. 83-85; Plut. *Ages.* 23.

5. Disaffection among certain Peloponnesians only emerged clearly at the end of the Corinthian War, when Agesilaus directed harshly repressive measures against *poleis* with democratic leanings: see Xen. *Hell.* 5. 1. 29. Subsequent forced reduction of Mantinea (Paus. 8. 8. 5-8; Polyb. 4. 27. 6; Xen. *Hell.* 5. 4. 2-7; Diod. 15. 5. 12) was inspired by doubts about Mantinean loyalty during the Corinthian War. R. Legon's excellent article, "Phliasian Politics and Policy in the Early Fourth Century B.C.," *Historia* 16 (1967): 324-37, examines in full the similar treatment of Phlius.

6. See G. Grote, *A History of Greece*, vol. 7 (London, 1888), pp. 522-24; Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*², 3.2:80-81; R. E. Smith, "The Opposition to Agesilaus' Foreign Policy, 394-371 B.C.," *Historia* 2 (1954): 274; Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*⁶, 5:245-46; Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories*, p. 243.

7. In the winter of 393/92: Xen. *Hell.* 4. 4. 10; Diod. 14. 86; Aristides 2. 370.

8. Xen. *Hell.* 4. 8. 3-10; Diod. 14. 84. 3-5. D. M. Lewis, *Sparta and Persia* (Leyden, 1977), p. 145, n. 61, suggested that the occupation of Cythera actually provoked the decision to send Antalcidas to Sardis.

9. See Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*⁶, 5:242-43 with notes, and H. W. Parke, "The Development of the Second Spartan Empire," *JHS* 50 (1930): 41.

the Aegean basin. Antalcidas therefore obtained plenipotentiary power to treat with Tiribazus in Sardis.¹⁰

Antalcidas advised the *karanos* that the Athenians had now become the real threat to Persian interests, since the Peloponnesians no longer maintained an Aegean fleet. His purpose was to win Tiribazus over to active support of the Spartan cause, or at least to halt Pharnabazus' subventions to the coalition.¹¹ The Spartans hoped in effect to conclude a bilateral treaty with the Persians, for whom the abandonment of Greek Asia was Antalcidas' most attractive concession.

At first Antalcidas enjoyed nearly total success. He won over Tiribazus, who promised to discuss the proposals personally with Artaxerxes II. Prospects for a Sparto-Persian accord seemed quite good.¹² Word of Antalcidas' mission, however, could not be suppressed indefinitely, and when the Athenians learned of it, they invited the Argives, Corinthians, and Thebans to join them in a visit to Sardis. No sooner had the legates from the coalition arrived than Tiribazus, in keeping with his pro-Spartan stance, arrested Conon as an enemy of the Great King. Antalcidas and Tiribazus then proposed that all islands and *poleis* (except, of course, those of Asia and Lacedaemon) be autonomous. This clause was intended to strike at all members of the coalition. The Argives, who had begun the annexation of Corinth, would suffer;¹³ so would the Athenians, who feared for the islands of Scyros, Lemnos, and Imbros that lay en route to their sources of Euxine grain; and so would the Boeotians, at the head of whose league stood the Thebans. The territorial dismemberment of each partner in the coalition would leave Sparta supreme in Greece. Needless to say, the terms proposed by Tiribazus and Antalcidas were unacceptable to the coalition and the conference broke up.¹⁴

It is not likely that Antalcidas was too distressed at this turn of events. He believed that Tiribazus, who had secretly given him funds to refit a fleet after the conference had ended, would persuade the Great King to switch his allegiance to the Peloponnesians. Had this in fact happened,

10. Tiribazus, formerly satrap of Armenia, replaced the rebellious Ariaeus after the latter had taken over for the executed Tissaphernes: see Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*², 3.1:81, n. 1; H. Schaefer, "Tiribazos," *RE* 6A.2 (1937): 1435; Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*⁸, 5:245-46.

11. As E. Auccello ("La genesi della pace di Antalcida," *Helikon* 5 [1965]: 355) has noted, Tiribazus, in replacing Ariaeus, had come not merely as satrap of Lydia, but as *karanos*. This position, formerly held by Tissaphernes, was normal for the Persian overlord in Sardis, who was the Great King's στρατηγός τῶν κάτω, that is, military chief for all of western Asia Minor. See Thuc. 8. 5. 4; Xen. *An.* 1. 1. 2-4. *Hell.* 3. 1. 3.

12. Xen. *Hell.* 4. 8. 12-17.

13. In order to consolidate their newly won authority, the Corinthian democrats, who had treacherously massacred 120 Iaconizers and driven 500 others into exile at the festival of Artemis Euclea, invited an Argive garrison to occupy the town. With the collusion of the democratic government, the Argives began a process that led eventually to complete isopolity between Corinth and Argos: see Xen. *Hell.* 4. 4. 1-6 and Diod. 14. 86. 1.

14. Auccello, "Genesi," pp. 344, 364, has observed that Tiribazus became *karanos* to offset the one-sided favoritism shown to Athens by Pharnabazus, who, as Hellespontine satrap, also had proved weak in claiming Greek Asia for the Great King: see Xen. *Hell.* 4. 8. 1. Moreover, Plato asserts (*Menex.* 245B-C) that the Athenians alone of the coalition also objected to abandoning the Greeks of Asia.

with a vigorous shipbuilding effort and a continuous transfusion of Persian silver, the Spartans would have quickly attained military dominance and thus have forced the coalition to a settlement.

The failure of the conference in Sardis made necessary Tiribazus' visit to the royal court in Susa. As some scholars have noted, Sparta alone could not have guaranteed the terms proposed in Sardis without the acquiescence of the coalition.¹⁵ It would thus be necessary to persuade Artaxerxes as quickly as possible to continue the aid to Sparta which the *karanos* had begun.¹⁶ Although some historians believe that Tiribazus stayed in Lydia until the failure of the second conference in Sparta, or that he only reached Susa in the autumn of 392, a date in the spring for his appearance at court is more likely.¹⁷ The recent suggestion that the real stimulus for Antalcidas' mission was the coalition's occupation of Cythera in 393 is very attractive. On this view the reasons that Xenophon mentions for Antalcidas' mission (*Hell.* 4. 8. 12) were purely secondary, since the main issue was the sudden exposure of Lacedaemon itself to raids by the coalition from a base on the island.¹⁸ Thus the anxiety provoked by their vulnerability would have induced the Spartans to send Antalcidas to Sardis *very early*, probably in the winter of 393/92.

When Tiribazus arrived in Susa in the spring of 392, he set forth the proposals made by Antalcidas to the Great King, but he was unable to persuade Artaxerxes to embrace the Peloponnesian cause. The monarch as yet too deeply resented the pillage inflicted by the Spartans in Anatolia under Thibron, Dercylidas, and Agesilaus in the years from 400 to 394 B.C. As a result, he stripped Tiribazus of his position and replaced him with Struthas, who released Conon and overtly favored the Athenians.¹⁹ Tiribazus had quite simply overstepped his authority. Antalcidas initiated discussions with the *karanos*, whose only mission was to curb Pharnabazus and Athens, not accommodate Sparta.²⁰ After the talks in Sardis failed, Tiribazus acted on his own to seek rapprochement with the Peloponnesians and secretly funded a shipbuilding program for them. For this reason, he lost his position in Asia Minor when Artaxerxes rejected Antalcidas' proposals.²¹

15. See V. Martin, "Le traitement de l'histoire diplomatique dans la tradition littéraire du IV^e siècle avant J.-C.," *MH* 1 (1944): 19, and R. Seager, "Thrasybulus, Conon and Athenian Imperialism," *JHS* 87 (1967): 105.

16. A. H. M. Jones, *Sparta* (Oxford, 1967), pp. 110–11.

17. See G. E. Underhill, *Commentary on Xenophon's "Hellenica"* (Oxford, 1906), pp. lii–liv, who dated the gathering at Sardis to late summer and Conon's arrest to the autumn of 392. Seager, "Thrasybulus," p. 20, n. 94, suggested that the *karanos* only left Lydia at the time of the second gathering in Sparta. Aucello, "Genesi," pp. 355–57, believed that Tiribazus encouraged Antalcidas to seek a purely Greek settlement in Sparta: this, however, would have left Agesilaus free to resume his campaigns in Asia Minor, something that would have pleased neither Tiribazus nor Antalcidas. According to this view, Tiribazus would have stayed in Sardis until the failure of the second conference: see also Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*², 3.2:222.

18. Xen. *Hell.* 4. 8. 7–8, and see at n. 8, above.

19. Xen. *Hell.* 4. 8. 15–17. Although Conon sailed for Cyprus a free man, he fell ill there and died by the spring of 391: see H. Swoboda, "Konon," *RE* 11.2 (1922): 1332–33.

20. Xen. *Hell.* 4. 8. 12; Diod. 14. 85. 4.

21. See Xen. *Hell.* 4. 8. 15–17; Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*⁶, 5:251–53; S. Accame, *Ricerche intorno alla guerra corinzia* (Naples, 1951), pp. 116–23; Smith, "Opposition," pp. 277–78 (*pace* Aucello, "Genesi," p. 371).

Through late spring and most of the summer the Spartans would outfit their new fleet to regain control of the Corinthian Gulf. Strategically, of course, Tiribazus' dismissal would not alter matters in the Aegean, where Sparta no longer had a role to play, as Antalcidas had shown. After Artaxerxes' swift and decisive rejection of Tiribazus' advocacy, Struthas' arrival in Sardis seems to have caused a political reshuffling at Sparta by late summer.²² Before we consider the naval and military activity that resulted from this political realignment, we should ask how Sparta's other major figure may have reacted to the collapse of Antalcidas' initiative.

Although Agesilaus had become king under unusual circumstances, the earliest years of his reign proved quite successful.²³ Within a year of his accession the ephors were able to suppress an alarmingly widespread movement aimed at the massacre of all Spartiates and the overthrow of the socio-political order in Lacedaemon. The conspiracy came to light during a spoiled sacrifice at which the king was officiating.²⁴ As was noted above, Agesilaus had later obtained supreme command of all Greek forces in Asia. His activities in Anatolia were resoundingly successful, even though Theban disruption of his sacrifices at Aulis had cast an ill-omened pall over the expedition's inauguration.²⁵ In two years' campaigning he inflicted a major defeat on the Persians near Sardis and culled an enormous amount of booty by systematically pillaging the satrapal domains. But after Conon's sweeping defeat of the Peloponnesian navy, for which he was at least indirectly responsible, and an inconclusive victory at Coronea, both in 394, it is likely that Agesilaus' prestige was dimmed. The triumphs of Conon and Pharnabazus in Greece proper in 393 also did little to enhance the king's image. In any case, apart from Plutarch's description of a plot by Lysander discovered after the latter's death and the victory of his sister's chariot at Olympia in 392, the ancient sources are silent about the king from the fall of 394 to the spring of 391 B.C.²⁶

By the autumn of 392, however, Struthas' arrival in Sardis had made it clear that Agesilaus would again surge to the fore. Since a military solution once again suggested itself, it was only natural that the Spartans should turn to their most successful soldier to achieve it. Indeed, some scholars believe that the failure to reach a negotiated settlement in Sardis or Sparta made Agesilaus' domination inevitable.²⁷ Another view would

22. For the conjecture that the seizure of Cythera induced the Spartans to send Antalcidas to Sardis in the winter of 393/92, see at n. 8, above. For the suggestion that Tiribazus left for Susa immediately after the conference at Sardis, thus no later than the spring of 392, see Jones, *Sparta*, pp. 110–11. Arguments for a later date are remarked in n. 17.

23. See Xen. *Hell.* 3. 3. 1–4, *Ages.* 1. 5; Lys. 22. 3–6; Paus. 3. 8. 7–9; Nepos *Ages.* 1. 4–6; Plut. *Ages.* 3. 1–5.

24. Xen. *Hell.* 3. 3. 4–11; Arist. *Pol.* 1306b; Polyae. 2. 14. 1.

25. Xen. *Hell.* 3. 3. 4; Paus. 3. 9. 3–4; Plut. *Ages.* 6. 4–6. Since Agesilaus had planned to imitate Agamemnon here, the Boeotian interdiction engendered in the king a lifelong resentment against Thebes.

26. Plut. *Ages.* 20. 1–3. Smith, "Opposition," p. 278, n. 1, and David, *Sparta*, pp. 23–24, also allude to the scant mention of the king in the sources for the events of 393/92.

27. Smith, "Opposition," p. 278, and Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories*, p. 239.

have it that the king's influence revived, but only after both conferences had failed.²⁸ A consideration of Sparta's internal politics and the events of the fall of 392 will show nevertheless that Agesilaus' resurgence was already under way before the second conference began.

Because of a long-standing problem with the chronology of the Corinthian War, it is well to review briefly the main aspects of the muddle before examining the events of the autumn of 392. The difficulties arise from confusion in Diodorus' chronology and Xenophon's odd arrangement of maritime and continental events after Coronea (August 394). As a result, a slim possibility has always existed that the conference at Sardis occurred after the initiative in Sparta. In that case, the Isthmian games mentioned by Xenophon (*Hell.* 4. 5. 1) would be those, not of 390, but of 392 B.C. This would, however, force an unlikely compression of events, so that historians have recently preferred the more flexible reconstruction which would place the activities discussed below in 392 rather than in 393.²⁹

Although the only reference to Agesilaus for 392 has to do with the victory of his sister's charioteer at Olympia, it is clear that he cannot have approved of Antalcidas' diplomacy.³⁰ From his military experience he would have known that the Peloponnesians could not wage war against both Persia and the Greek coalition. Nonetheless, he would have found the notion of rapprochement with Persia repugnant. In 394 he had promised the Asian Greeks that he would personally resume the conduct of the war against Artaxerxes as soon as matters were settled in Greece.³¹ He never fully relinquished his hope of freeing Greek Asia from the Persians and was bitterly disappointed that he was never able to do so.³² Finally, Plutarch (*Ages.* 23. 1–3) notes a long-term animosity between the king and Antalcidas which makes it clear that Agesilaus would have resisted any notion of a Sparto-Persian accord. The description of Antalcidas as ἐχθρός to the king must be based on more than a difference of opinion concerning Agesilaus' hostility to the Thebans.³³ In fact, it is

28. David, *Sparta*, pp. 24–25.

29. Grote, *History of Greece*, 7:523–25, believed that the conference in Sardis was the only one to occur in 392 B.C. Some decades later O. Wilcken, "Zur Entstehung und Zweck des Königsfriedens," *APAW* 15 (1941): 4–11, suggested that both gatherings occurred in 392, but in reverse order, i.e., in Sparta first, then in Sardis. Aucello, "Genesi," pp. 341–42, who prefers to place both gatherings in 392, with Sardis first, lists some others who concur with Wilcken. The best refutation of Wilcken's notion is by V. Martin, "Sur une nouvelle interprétation de la Paix du Roi," *MH* 6 (1949): 128–31. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*², 3.1:82, Accame, *Ricerche*, pp. 111, 117, Smith, "Opposition," p. 278, Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*⁶, 5:248, T. T. B. Ryder, *Koine Eirene* (Oxford, 1965), p. 32, and Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories*, pp. 252–53, all argue for the order Sardis-Sparta. H. Bengtson, *Griechische Geschichte*² (Munich, 1977), p. 268, n. 1, prefers to follow Wilcken.

30. See Xen. *Ages.* 9. 6; Plut. *Ages.* 20. 1, *Apo. Lac.* 49; Paus. 3. 8. 1; and E. Honigmann, "Struthas," *RE* 12.1 (1924): 2.

31. Xen. *Hell.* 4. 2. 3–5, *Ages.* 1. 38; Plut. *Ages.* 15. 5.

32. Isoc. *Epist. ad Archidam.* 11; Plut. *Ages.* 15. Agesilaus had pledged to return to Anatolia for this purpose upon leaving for Greece in 394; see n. 31. As proof that Asian Greeks resented their formal abandonment to Susa in 387 under terms of the "King's Peace," B. Wesenberg, "Agesilaos im Artemision," *ZPE* 41 (1981): 178–79, has suggested that an inscription from the Artemision in Ephesus dedicated by Agesilaus in 395 was intentionally mutilated after 387/86.

33. Smith, "Opposition," pp. 277–78, tried to show that Plutarch extrapolated from Antalcidas' resistance to Agesilaus' Theban policy after 386, to conclude that he opposed the king in all matters;

probably to Antalcidas' first visit with Tiribazus that the enmity dates, since Agesilaus was forced to cooperate with his rival in 388/87 to end the war.³⁴ Since the evidence indicates that Agesilaus was opposed to Antalcidas' mission, what might the king's reaction have been to its failure?

To a soldier of Agesilaus' stature and experience, a vigorous campaign against the coalition would suggest itself. Using Tiribazus' money to fit out a fleet, the Spartans could hope to regain control of the Corinthian Gulf, thereby assuring maritime access to central Greece. Simultaneously, they would view Corinth's long walls to Lechaëum and the nascent Argive-Corinthian sympolity as serious obstacles to their access through the isthmus. Thus a campaign by land around Corinth and in the Argolid would also suggest itself.³⁵ Hence in the summer of 392 Agesilaus' supporters very likely set in motion a strategy to achieve a military victory over the coalition upon Struthas' arrival as *karanos* in Sardis.³⁶

To implement the naval component of this strategy, Podanemus, navarch for 393/92, opened an offensive to regain the gulf for Sparta.³⁷ In an engagement near Rhium he was killed and his adjutant Pollias was wounded; but the Spartans eventually drove the Corinthians off the gulf and blockaded them in Lechaëum. Since Herippidas accomplished this after assuming Podanemus' unexpired navarchy, the influence of Agesilaus becomes apparent. The careers of the two men had been closely connected at least as early as the king's Anatolian campaigns. In 396 Herippidas had replaced Xenophon as commander of the Cyreans and a year later had become Agesilaus' chief of staff after Lysander went home in disgrace.³⁸ That Herippidas filled Podanemus' unexpired command may not be coincidental, but rather part of the design to restore the conduct of foreign policy to Agesilaus. Thus the king's prestige probably "revived," not after the failure of the second conference, but upon Struthas' investiture as *karanos* several months earlier.³⁹ In any event, it seems clear that the Peloponnesians had decided to press for military advantage that autumn as a prelude to any further diplomatic activity.

but G. Cawkwell, "Agesilaus and Sparta," *CQ* 26 (1976): 68–69, has demonstrated that Plutarch cannot have been mistaken about such a fundamental point, since he was too well informed about Antalcidas' career.

34. See also E. Zierke, *Agesilaos* (Ph.D. diss., Frankfurt, 1936), pp. 50–51, and Accame, *Ricerche*, pp. 116–17.

35. In the spring of 391 Agesilaus did lead an incursion against Argos: Xen. *Hell.* 3. 4. 19; Diod. 14. 97. 5; Plut. *Ages.* 21. 1–2. The events of late 392 made it unnecessary for him to campaign against Lechaëum: see below.

36. See K. Fiehn, "Herippidas," *RE* 4A.1 (1931): 384; Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*⁶, 5:256 with notes; and nn. 21 and 22, above.

37. P. Poralla, *Prosopographie der Lakedaimonier* (Breslau, 1913), p. 167, Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*², 3.1:87–88, and esp. Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*⁶, 5:254, n. 1, have nicely reconstructed the chronology of the Spartan navarchs for the early fourth century.

38. See Xen. *Hell.* 3. 4. 20; T. Lenschau, "Herippidas," *RE* 8.1 (1912): 684–85; and Smith, "Opposition," p. 278, n. 1.

39. Pace David, *Sparta*, p. 25 with notes, who believes that the decision to make "a supreme effort to win the war" also dates to the failure of the gathering at Sparta. The military, naval, and political activity of the autumn, however, would seem to belie this.

Although the campaign against the Argives would have to wait until the following spring, about the time of Herippidas' success at sea, a splendid opportunity arose for the Spartans to gain control of the isthmus. Two laconizing aristocrats in Corinth, Pasimelus and Alcimenes, offered to betray Lechaëum from within to the Spartan harmost at Sicyon. Deep resentment at the massacre of their friends during the Euclea festival and the democrats' support of sympolity with Argos prompted their decision. Under the cover of darkness, when the plotters were ready, Praxitas led some troops to the walls, where Pasimelus and Alcimenes admitted them to the port. Although unable to take Corinth itself, Praxitas captured Lechaëum after slaughtering the Boeotian garrison. He then dismantled a section of the long walls to give the Spartans unimpeded access to central Greece. Finally, he soon took the fortresses of Sidus, Crommyum, and Epiecea in the Megarid, thereby altering the complexion of the war before disbanding his troops and withdrawing to Lacedaemon.⁴⁰

In two decisive strokes the Spartans had nullified the advantages accruing to the coalition from the success of Conon and Pharnabazus and from the democratic revolution at Corinth. Indeed, as the balance had now swung back to the Peloponnesians, Agesilaus and his supporters seem also to have seized the political initiative.⁴¹ Although evidence is lacking for a close connection between the king and Praxitas, the harmost's success in the Corinthia greatly enhanced the position of those favoring military advantage as a prelude to negotiation. In addition to Herippidas' appointment, Agesilaus contrived the election for 392/91 of his half brother Teleutias as either navarch or adjutant.⁴² In order to assume control of policy, the king would naturally seek important posts for his closest supporters. He would also strive to obtain a majority on the board of ephors, whose collective role had long been the most powerful in the state.⁴³ If we are correct in assigning the ephors' annual assumption of office to the autumnal equinox,⁴⁴ it is a reasonable assumption that Agesilaus worked to place at least three of his partisans on the board of five for the coming year.⁴⁵ The course of events

40. Xen. *Hell.* 4. 4. 6–13; Diod. 14. 86. 2–4; also Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories*, p. 251.

41. Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories*, pp. 251–52.

42. See Xen. *Hell.* 4. 4. 19; Plut. *Ages.* 21. 1; and Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*⁶, 5:245, 251. Underhill suggested (*Commentary*, p. 345) that the apparent difficulty with Teleutias' several appointments as chief naval officer can be resolved by assuming that, before his official navarchy in 387/86, he had already served as ἐπιστολεύς.

43. See G. Gilbert, *The Constitutional Antiquities of Sparta and Athens* (London, 1895), pp. 52–59; T. Szanto, "Ephoroi," *RE* 5.2 (1905): 2860–64; G. Busolt and H. Swoboda, *Griechische Staatskunde* (Munich, 1926), pp. 685–87; and H. Michell, *Sparta* (Cambridge, 1952), pp. 126–31.

44. Gilbert, *Constitutional Antiquities*, p. 53, believed that the Spartan ephors took office at the equinox. Busolt and Swoboda, *Griechische Staatskunde*, p. 686, n. 5, and Michell, *Sparta*, p. 126, thought that this occurred rather at the December solstice. Nonetheless, a reading of Thuc. 5. 19 and 36 appears to make the autumn date more likely.

45. This would have meant, specifically, working against the "medizing" supporters of Antalcidas. That Agesilaus was expert in dealing with the ephors from the outset of his kingship emerges from Plutarch's discussion (*Ages.* 4. 2–4) of the king's personal style.

that autumn and in the following spring, I believe, indicates that he succeeded.⁴⁶

Before I discuss the terms proposed for the second conference, a brief review of the altered strategic situation is in order. With the Lacedaemonian sweep of the gulf, the coalition had lost its naval momentum in the west. Praxitas' capture of Lechaëum and partial demolition of Corinth's long walls had revealed serious rifts in the Corinthian political fabric, while once again raising for the Athenians the specter of a Spartan invasion of Attica. In central Greece the Boeotians were still faced with hostile forces in Orchomenos and Phocis. Thus only the Argives, who had begun the annexation of Corinth, still had reason to fight. The Greeks therefore convened for the second time in less than a year to essay a diplomatic resolution, but now without the *éminence grise* of Persia.

After the Peloponnesian successes that autumn, Agesilaus appears to have regained political ascendancy. Thus a major condition for any conference in Sparta would have been the exclusion of the Persians, since rapprochement with Susa had been the centerpiece of Antalcidas' failed effort.⁴⁷ In fact, as Struthas' appointment had shown, Artaxerxes still considered a state of war to exist between the two powers. Thus Spartans who had favored the diplomacy of Antalcidas would likely be apprehensive at, or at best uninterested in, a purely Greek resolution, even though Agesilaus' supporters and most Greeks of the coalition would favor such an effort.⁴⁸

How would Spartans interested in pursuing a military solution have viewed a possible negotiated settlement in late autumn of 392? The king would clearly have little to lose and much to gain. First, such a settlement would not jeopardize the Spartan advantage, while it would give time to replenish the treasury and attend to matters within the alliance. Further, a Hellas at peace would eventually permit the king to fulfill his pledge to the Greeks of Asia.⁴⁹ Not incidentally, another Asian campaign could alleviate the economic plight of those Spartiates reduced in status to ὑπομείων, or "inferior." Such people had suffered impoverishment and loss of the franchise in the frantic scramble for wealth after the great victory over Athens in 404 B.C.⁵⁰ Moreover, other dissidents within

46. Accame, *Ricerche*, p. 116, has suggested that the king successfully canvassed for a majority on the board of 392/91.

47. Accame, *Ricerche*, pp. 117–18, observed that Agesilaus and his friends would insist on the exclusion of Persia from Greek affairs in order to achieve a true κοινὴ εἰρήνη, not merely a settlement dictated by Artaxerxes; see also Ryder, *Koine Eirene*, pp. 31–33.

48. But see Aucello, "Genesi," pp. 366–67, and David, *Sparta*, p. 24, who both suggest that Antalcidas and his friends persuaded the Spartans to host the second conference.

49. Agesilaus' colleague Dercylidas, although confined to Abydos, still held the bridgehead for an eventual return to Greek Asia: see Xen. *Hell.* 4. 3. 2–3.

50. David, *Sparta*, pp. 70–75, discusses the effect of Epitadeus' *rhetra* (alienation of private estates) and the plight of "inferiors" in the first decade of the fourth century. On service abroad, these people could at least hope for personal enrichment, even if they could not win back the franchise.

Lacedaemon could safely be dispatched to the far side of the Aegean.⁵¹ Finally, even if the conference were to fail, the Peloponnesians could press their military advantage.

Some scholars have recently argued that the chance for a second conference arose when the peace party at Athens, whose spokesman was Andocides, made overtures to the ephors.⁵² If indeed the more prosperous and laconizing Athenians made the offer because of the altered strategic situation, it would have greatly interested the partisans of Agesilaus. Antalcidas' supporters, however, would have viewed any purely Greek settlement with unease, since Agesilaus would then be free to return to Asia. They would have lost any chance to regain political momentum, while sustaining an indefinite setback in their efforts to achieve rapprochement with Artaxerxes.⁵³ Since by the winter political momentum had swung back to Agesilaus, the Spartans certainly would have accepted an Athenian proposal which excluded the Persians. In fact, if Agesilaus had obtained his majority on the board of ephors earlier that autumn, it is even possible that the proposal for the gathering originated in Sparta. In that case, Andocides and the Athenian laconizers would have persuaded the assembly at least to hear what the Spartans might be offering.⁵⁴

The terms decided upon at the winter gathering were somewhat different from those of the earlier conference.⁵⁵ Although the surrender of Greek Asia was not an issue, without Persian backing the Spartans could not press for a rigidly enforced autonomy in Greece proper or the Aegean. While some scholars believe that the surrender of Greek Asia was again proposed at the conference in Sparta, this view is based on Didymus' synopsis of Philochorus, where the phrase "the peace ἦν κατέπεμψεν ὁ βασιλεύς" is a clear confusion of the gathering in 392/91 with that of 387/86: all that Artaxerxes "sent down" in 392 was Struthas, to replace Tiribazus who had exceeded his authority.⁵⁶ Andocides, therefore, did not mention the abandonment of the Asian Greeks because it was not proposed.⁵⁷ Nonetheless Agesilaus had to make at least one concession. Despite his bitterness at the terrible affront that the Thebans

51. Grote, *History of Greece*, 7:420–21, wrote nearly a century ago that internal discord would prompt the ephors to send restive individuals within Lacedaemon on "distant and lucrative military service."

52. See esp. Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories*, pp. 252–53.

53. Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories*, pp. 80–96, and David, *Sparta*, pp. 10–22, have shown that the cessation of Spartan adventures overseas had long been a central aim of Antalcidas' supporters.

54. M. Cary, *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. 6 (Cambridge, 1953), p. 51, and Jones, *Sparta*, pp. 110–11, state that the ephors called the second conference. If this is true, Agesilaus perhaps even thought to steal his rival's diplomatic thunder.

55. Our only sources for the conference in Sparta are Andocides' *De pace*, its hypothesis, a brief allusion in Plutarch's *Moralia* 835A, and Didymus' confused synopsis of Philochorus in *FGrH* 3B:141 (no. 328, F 149). For a précis of all the evidence pertaining to both conferences, see Martin, "Nouvelle interprétation," pp. 127–31.

56. See *FGrH* 3B:515–16; Auccello, "Genesi," pp. 357–58; Seager, "Thrasybulus," p. 105, n. 94; and Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, p. 146, n. 68.

57. I. A. F. Bruce, "Athenian Embassies in the Early Fourth Century B.C.," *Historia* 15 (1966): 279.

had inflicted upon him at Aulis, he could not insist upon the dismemberment of the Boeotian League, as he was to do in 386. Similarly, the Athenians were to retain Scyros, Lemnos, and Imbros, although the Spartans did insist on the dissolution of the nascent sympolity between Corinth and Argos.⁵⁸

Two interesting questions about the second conference now emerge. First, why did it fail? Second, how might one account for Xenophon's silence about it? When Andocides' legation and the others had retired to their respective *poleis* for deliberation, no consensus came about. Despite the orator's exertions and the amenability of the Spartans, the Athenian *demos* rejected the proposal. It is true that Athenians of Andocides' wealth and social class would have preferred peace, since Scyros, Lemnos, and Imbros were firmly in the Athenian ambit. For a time, perhaps even those advocating war were hesitant because of Attica's sudden vulnerability to attack. But when the shock of Praxitas' coup subsided, it seems that the war party's fear of invasion subsided also.

Most Athenians, moreover, would reject a settlement that did not specifically guarantee freedom for the Greeks of Asia. Had Antalcidas been the one to press for the second conference, Andocides could simply have glossed over the fate of Greek Asia; but for the reasons outlined above, the question of Anatolia most probably never surfaced that winter. The *demos* in any case would not take Pharnabazus' mere hints at Greek autonomy in Asia in 394 as sufficient, even with the arrival in Sardis of the pro-Athenian Struthas. Finally, most Athenian cleruchs would be loath to accept any settlement ratifying the status quo, since many of them had lost their holdings in Asia Minor and the islands. Such reversals, if not made good, could lead to the loss of Athenian citizenship.⁵⁹ Thus most Athenians realized that the Spartans were offering them nothing that they did not already have. The assembly, sure of its Euxine grain, rejected the advocacy of Andocides, because those who resented Sparta's hegemony found a strong anti-Spartan coalition, funded by the satraps, more attractive than a sterile peace.⁶⁰

In Corinth the oligarchs, of course, would be happy to accede to the Spartan demand for a dissolution of the unprecedented bond with Argos. Further, the lands of the aristocrats would no longer lie open to Spartan pillage, nor would wealthy Corinthian merchants find access to the sea impeded by a Spartan blockade.⁶¹ These people, however, would not have sufficient strength to overcome the democratic government: Corinthian acceptance was, therefore, problematic. The Argives, faced with a forced withdrawal from a partially annexed city and an uncontested

58. Andoc. 3. 20; see also Accame, *Ricerche*, p. 118, and Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories*, pp. 252, 254–55.

59. Aucello, "Genesi," p. 370.

60. See Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*², 3.1:82–83; Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*⁶, 5:248–49; Ryder, *Koine Eirene*, pp. 32–33; and Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories*, pp. 258–59.

61. D. Kagan, "Corinthian Politics and the Revolution of 392 B.C.," *Historia* 11 (1962): 447–57, ventured a reconstruction of the year's bitter factional strife in the city.

acknowledgment of Spartan supremacy in the Peloponnese, could not approve the proposal. Thus of the four *poleis* in the coalition, only the Thebans, whose Boeotian hegemony was still intact, likely supported the settlement.⁶²

With the failure of the conference at Sparta, the last chance for a diplomatic resolution had passed. Xenophon's silence on the second effort perhaps derives from the support given it by the partisans of Agesilaus, who would have had the most to gain from a purely Greek peace. Whether the idea for the conference originated with Andocides' faction in Athens or Agesilaus' group in Sparta, the king's support for an effort which fared no better than his rival's perhaps induced the king's admirer to pass it over in silence.⁶³

In any event, the war would end only when the Persian court and Agesilaus' partisans acknowledged a coalescence of interests. As a result, a Greek world grown weary of war continued to struggle for nearly five more years. In 388, however, events would force Agesilaus to lay aside his differences with Antalcidas. Thus his rival's original judgment (and that of Tiribazus) would be vindicated. The king would acknowledge the unhappy truth, that Spartan interests demanded peace in Europe, even at the expense of the Asian Greeks' autonomy.⁶⁴ At the same time Artaxerxes accepted the fact that Athenian expansion into the Aegean and aid to rebellious Persian subjects were more harmful to his interests than the Spartans.⁶⁵ Although Agesilaus began to resume control of policy with Antalcidas' failure in Sardis, it is ironic that he came to preside over Sparta's rise to the zenith of her power in the ancient world only by cooperation with his most persistent rival and by retreat from his most cherished ideal.

Loyola University

62. This was a major concession by Agesilaus, of course, but any chance to return to Asia Minor would outweigh the purely negative urge to avenge himself on the Thebans for their outrage at Aulis. Aucello, "Genesi," p. 361, notes that the autonomy specified in 392/91 was much less rigid than that of the "King's Peace" in 387/86.

63. Aucello, "Genesi," p. 352, n. 48, hinted at this explanation, but left the matter open. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*², 3.1:82, n. 1, believed that Xenophon simply thought the matter inconsequential.

64. See Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*⁶, 5:265, n. 2; Wilcken, "Entstehung und Zweck," p. 12; and Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories*, p. 307, n. 27.

65. Xen. *Hell.* 5. 1. 28 and Plut. *Ariax.* 27. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*², 3.1:89, observed that, in fact, aid to Acoris and Euagoras had placed the Athenians in a virtual state of war with the Great King: see also Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*⁶, 5:265–66, and Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories*, p. 298.